Research

Job Market Paper

Abstract

In the presence of labor market failures, workers may have financial incentives that penalize safety. This paper studies how failing to account for this incentive problem may result in ineffective safety interventions. We evaluate a policy introduced to curb excessive driving in trucking, an industry in which workplace accidents often generate a public safety externality. The policy inadvertently heightened the payoff for other unsafe driving practices, such as speeding, including during unsafe weather. Using data on 1.4 million truck crashes across the continental United States, we first show that truck crashes increase by 150 to 220 percent on days with icy weather. Leveraging the fact that the policy was binding for only a subset of truckers, we find that it led those truckers to experience 7 percent more crashes in icy conditions relative to a no-policy counterfactual. We then descriptively consider how alternative policy measures might affect safety and aggregate social welfare.

Published Articles

Working Papers

Better Labor Market Options Reduce Workplace Injuries
with R. Jisung Park and Anna Stansbury (revise and resubmit, Journal of Public Economics)

Why Environmental Economics Can’t Avoid the Jobs Question
with E. Mark Curtis and R. Jisung Park (submitted)

Workplace heat burdens the poor and young: Quantifying individual climate risk in the US labor market
with A. Patrick Behrer and R. Jisung Park (draft available upon request)

Works in Progress

Successful Transitions out of Fossil Fuel Jobs
with E. Mark Curtis, R. Jisung Park, and Eleanor Krause